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A VERMONT YANKEE IN KING BURGER'S COURT: 
CONSTRAINTS ON JUDICIAL REVIEW UNDER NEPA 
James F. Raymond* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In 1978, an electrical industry journal confidently stated that "the 
publicized nuclear power issues, such as nuclear safety, radioactive 
waste disposal, and nuclear proliferation, are issues that have clear 
technical solutions with extremely low hypothetical risks."1 Other 
industry spokesmen described the chance of a major nuclear acci-
dent as "incredible,"2 and lobbyists pressured the government to 
shorten the lengthy nuclear plant licensing process.3 Although an-
tinuclear groups and governmental committees did release reports 
questioning these safety claims,4 the nation seemed prepared to 
accept nuclear power as the most feasible energy source.5 
Then, in the spring of 1979, the Three Mile Island nuclear gener-
ating plant, near Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, suffered a cooling sys-
tem breakdown and leaked radiation into the environment.8 For 
several days, while pregnant women and young children were evacu-
ated from the area,7 the nation watched in suspense as nuclear 
experts tried to cope with the unforeseen threat posed by the 
buildup of a potentially explosive gas bubble in the reactor.H A 
* Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW 
I Starr, The Electricity Future: What Can You Believe?, ELECTRIC POWER RESEARCH INST. 
J. 28, 31 (July/August 1978). 
2 See, e.g., Carolina Environmental Study Group v. United States, 510 F.2d 796, 799 (D.C. 
Cir. 1975). 
3 E.g., Regulation, AEI J. GoV'T & SOC'y 12 (July/August 1978). 
4 See, e.g., N.Y. Times, July 12, 1978, at 13, col. 4. The White House Office of Science and 
Technology warned that a solution to the waste storage problem is years away. Id. 
a [d., April 10, 1979, at AI, col. 1. 
• Boston Globe, March 29, 1979, at 1, col. 3. 
7 [d., March 31, 1979, at 3, col. 1. 
• [d., April 2, 1979, at 1, col. 4. 
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safety committee reported shortly after the accident that "serious 
human, mechanical, and design errors" had contributed to the inci-
dentS and, alarmingly, that several items causing the accident were 
present in other plants then in operation. lO Reports also disclosed 
that nuclear officials, although previously aware of serious problems 
in similar plants, had failed to order any review of the safety proce-
dures in the stricken Three Mile Island plant. ll The prior declara-
tions by industry spokesmen on nuclear safety sounded hollow in 
comparison. 
The possibility of nuclear accidents and the need for a cautious 
approach to nuclear development did not escape legislative atten-
tion when Congress created the regulatory structure for atomic 
power. Besides giving general regulatory power to the Nuclear Regu-
latory Commission,12 Congress established a multi-step licensing 
process designed to maximize safety considerations. A nuclear 
power plant must be licensed twice, once for a construction permit 
and again for a license to operate,l3 Initially, the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission's staff and the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safe-
guards14 review the utility's application for a construction permit. 
Then, the Commission prepares a draft environmental impact 
statement15 on the proposed plant, which, after circulating and re-
ceiving comments on the draft, 18 it follows with a final environmen-
tal impact statement.17 These impact statements are necessary in 
order to comply with the requirements of the National Environmen-
• N.Y. Times, April 5, 1979, at AI, col. 6. 
,. [d., at B15, col. 2. 
" Boston Globe, April 3, 1979, at 12. 
12 Congress established the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) with the dual roles of pro-
moting and regulating nuclear power. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-703, §§ 1-
28, 68 Stat. 919 (1954) (amended 1974). Recognizing the conflict between these two roles, 
Congress abolished the AEC in the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974,42 U.S.C. § 5814(a) 
(1976), giving the regulatory role to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and the 
promotional role to the Energy Research and Development Agency (ERDA). After the aboli-
tion of AEC, NRC was substituted as a party in the challenged licensing proceedings leading 
to the Vermont Yankee decision. NRDC v. NRC, 547 F.2d 633,637 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1976). Both 
NRC and AEC will be referred to as the Commission. 
'3 42 U.S.C. §§ 2133, 2232, 2235, 2239 (1976). 
" The Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards is an independent board of nuclear 
experts that studies and reports to the Commission on the hazards and safety standards of 
every proposed nuclear plant. 42 U.S.C. § 2039 (1976). 
" 10 C.F.R. § 51.22 (1978). 
" [d. § 51.25. 
17 [d. § 51.26. 
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tal Policy Act. 18 Subsequently, after a public adjudicatory hearing 
on all construction permits and on contested operating permits, IV 
the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board (Licensing Board) decides 
whether to issue the necessary license.2o Either the applicant or an 
intervenor21 may appeal the Licensing Board's decision to the 
Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board (Appeal Board)22 and, 
at its discretion, to the Commission itself.23 Ultimately, the Com-
mission's decision may be appealed to the United States Court of 
Appeals2f and, by writ of certiorari, to the United States Supreme 
Court. These procedural steps in the plant licensing process provide 
many opportunities for legal challenges, which antinuclear groups 
have been very willing to exploit. 
One such challenge began in 1971 when the Natural Resources 
Defense Council (NRDC) intervened in the licensing of a nuclear 
power plant in Vernon, Vermont. NRDC claimed that an operating 
license could not be granted to the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power 
Corporation because the Commission had failed to consider the en-
vironmental impact of reprocessing spent fuel and disposing of the 
plant's nuclear wastes. 25 NRDC also challenged the Commission's 
decision not to allow cross-examination or discovery at a later infor-
mal rulemaking proceeding26 that had been held to determine 
whether the licensing process should consider the effect of all stages 
of the uranium fuel cycle, including fuel reprocessing and waste 
disposal, and, if so, how to evaluate their environmental impact. 27 
Meanwhile, in another suit, several plaintiffs, including the Sagi-
naw Valley Nuclear Study Group (Saginaw),28 challenged the Com-
18 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-61 (1976). 
" The hearing for an operating license is limited to contested issues. 42 U.S.C. § 2239(a) 
(1976). 
2. Id. § 2241. The Licensing Board is usually comprised of one lawyer and two nuclear 
scientists. NRDC v. NRC, 547 F.2d 633, 637 nA (D.C. Cir. 1976). 
21 An interested person must petition the Commission for permission to intervene in the 
proceedings as a party. The Commission may grant restricted rights of intervention, or deny 
intervention completely if it considers that the petitioner's interest is not relevant or is 
already adequately represented. 10 C.F.R. § 2.714 (1978). 
22 Id. §§ 2.785-2.788. 
23 Id. § 2.786. 
24 28 U.S.C. § 2342(4) (1976). 
" Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. 4 AEC 930, 931 (1972). 
" NRDC v. NRC, 547 F.2d 633, 643 (D.C. Cir. 1976). Informal rulemaking is explained in 
text at notes 91-98, infra. 
27 NRDC v. NRC, 547 F.2d 633, 637-38 (D.C. Cir. 1976); 37 Fed. Reg. 24,191 (1972). 
" Saginaw was joined by the Mapleton Intervenors, consisting of Nelson Aeschliman and 
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mission's issuance of a permit to the Consumers Power Company for 
the construction of a nuclear plant in Midland, Michigan. 29 Saginaw 
contended that the environmental impact statement prepared for 
the Midland plant was defective because it failed to consider imple-
menting energy conservation methods that would reduce the need 
for the nuclear plant.30 In addition, Saginaw claimed that the Com-
mission should have permitted discovery of the findings of the Advi-
sory Committee on Reactor Safeguards, including interrogatories of 
its individual members.31 
Both NRDC and Saginaw were unsuccessful at the Commission 
level, and both intervenors appealed the Commission's decisions. 32 
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia decided both 
appeals on the same day33 and, in opinions written by Judge Baze-
lon, reversed the Commission on all issues.34 On the Vermont Yan-
kee licensing, the Appeals Court decided that the Commission must 
consider the effects of fuel reprocessing and waste disposal when it 
licenses individual plants.3• Furthermore, although the rule making 
procedure was an acceptable method of considering those effects,36 
the court held that the particular procedures used were inadequate 
because they failed to "ventilate" the issue fully,37 While the court 
did not require cross-examination or discovery, it suggested that 
these procedures could have cured the defects in the proceeding.3K 
In the Midland case, the Court of Appeals found that Saginaw's 
energy conservation contentions were sufficient to require their con-
sideration by the Commission.3D In addition, although the court did 
agree with the Commission's decision not to allow the discovery of 
five other residents of Mapleton, Michigan. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 
435 U.S. 519, 531 n.9 (1978). 
2. Consumers Power Co., 5 AEC 214, 222 (1972). Consumers Power applied for the construc· 
tion permit in January, 1969. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519, 
530 (1978). 
30 Aeschliman v. NRC, 547 F.2d 622, 625 (D.C. Cir. 1978). 
31 [d. at 630. 
32 Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519, 527-535 (1978). 
33 Aeschliman v. NRC, 547 F.2d 622 (D.C. Cir. 1976); NRDC v. NRC, 547 F.2d 633 (D.C. 
Cir. 1976). Both cases were decided on July 21, 1976 . 
.. In addition to writing the majority opinion in both cases, Judge Bazelon also responded 
in a separate statement to Judge Tamm's concurring opinion in NRDC v. NRC, 547 F.2d 633, 
655 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (Bazelon, J., separate statement) . 
.. NRDC v. NRC, 547 F.2d 633, 641 (D.C. Cir. 1976) . 
.. [d. 
37 [d. at 653. 
3M [d . 
.. Aeschliman v. NRC, 547 F.2d 622, 628 (D.C. Cir. 1976). 
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individual members of the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safe-
guards,40 it found the Advisory Committee's report to be inadequate 
because the report merely referred to certain problems in the reactor 
design without explaining them fully. 41 The court consequently or-
dered the Commission to return the report to the Advisory Commit-
tee for further discussion of those problems.42 
Combining both cases in Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corpo-
ration v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 43 the Supreme Court, 
speaking through Justice Rehnquist, decided all the issues in favor 
of the Commission.44 The Court upheld the Vermont Yankee licens-
ing,4S and found that the procedures used in the fuel cycle rulemak-
ing were adequate because they met the Administrative Procedure 
Act's48 minimum requirements for informal rulemakingY On the 
Midland licensing issues the Court held that the Commission's fail-
ure to consider Saginaw's energy conservation contentions fell 
within the Commission's discretion,48 and that the report of the 
Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards was adequate since the 
Committee had no obligation to explain further its conclusions. 4D 
This article examines the impact of Vermont Yankee on environ-
mental law, with particular emphasis on how the decision weakens 
the constraints imposed on agency discretion by prior cases under 
the National Environmental Policy Act. The first section discusses 
both the Commission's failure to consider the environmental impact 
of nuclear fuel reprocessing and waste disposal in the Vermont Yan-
kee licensing, and the sufficiency of the procedures used at the fuel 
cycle rulemaking proceedings held to consider that impact. The 
second section addresses the Commission's refusal to consider en-
ergy conservation as an alternative in the Midland plant's environ-
mental impact statement and the Supreme Court's interpretation 
of the role of the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards in the 
licensing process. 
41 [d. at 631. 
•• [d. 
41 [d. The Midland case also had a fuel cycle issue similar to, and controlled by, NRDC v. 
NRC. [d. at 632. 
u 435 U.S. 519 (1978) . 
•• Justices Blackmun and Powell took no part in the case. All the other Justices joined 
Justice Rehnquist's decision. [d. at 558 . 
•• [d. at 538-39 . 
•• 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-59, 701-06 (1976). 
47 Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519, 548 (1978). 
41 [d. at 554 . 
•• [d. at 556. 
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II. THE VERMONT YANKEE PLANT ISSUES 
A. The Back End of the Uranium Fuel Cycle 
The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA)50 re-
quires a federal agency to consider the environmental effects of any 
proposed action. 51 Under rules adopted by the Commission in order 
to comply with NEPA, the Licensing Board must include environ-
mental harm as a cost when it weighs the costs and benefits of a 
proposed reactor. 52 In Vermont Yankee, the Supreme Court ad-
dressed two questions concerning these requirements. The first 
question involved whether the Commission could issue a nuclear 
plant license without considering the environmental impact of fuel 
reprocessing and waste disposal. The second question concerned the 
adequacy of the procedures used by the Commission in a rulemak-
ing proceeding held to assess the impact of fuel reprocessing and 
waste disposal. 
Before examining the Court's opinion, some understanding of the 
uranium fuel cycle is necessary. The uranium fuel cycle includes all 
stages in the processing of nuclear fuel, from its mining as uranium 
ore until its final disposal as spent fuel. 53 Most of the activities in 
the fuel cycle occur away from the reactor site. The Vermont Yankee 
controversy concerned the stages of the fuel cycle, including fuel 
reprocessing and waste disposal, that follow the removal of the spent 
uranium fuel from the reactor. These final stages are called the back 
end of the fuel cycle. 
During the fission process in the reactor, the uranium fuel breaks 
down into several highly radioactive by-products54 and, therefore, 
must be replaced periodically. Reprocessing of the spent fuel in-
volves the extraction of usable plutonium and uranium.55 While 
reprocessing can increase nuclear fuel efficiency, it does not elimi-
nate the waste disposal problem because the disposal of other non-
usable fission products is still necessary. 58 
50 42 u.s.c. §§ 4321-61 (1976). 
" Id. §§ 4331, 4332. 
" 10 C.F.R. § 51.52(c)(3) (1978). 
" E. ODUM, FUNDAMENTALS OF ECOLOGY 465 (1971). The uranium fuel cycle stages include: 
(1) mining; (2) refining of the ore; (3) fuel enrichment; (4) nuclear element fabrication; (5) 
fuel burnup in the reactor; (6) spent fuel reprocessing; and (7) waste disposal. Id. 
54 L. LAPORTE, ENCOUNTER WITH THE EARTH 415 (1975). 
50 Lester & Rose, The Nuclear Wastes at West Valley, New York, TECH. REV. 20, 26-27 
(May 1977). 
" Id. All American commercial reprocessing plants have closed because of technical and 
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A nuclear power plant generates several forms of nuclear waste. 
High level wastes are produced primarily as fission products within 
the reactor's fuel rods,57 while lower level wastes are created both as 
fission products and by the contamination of other objects, such as 
pipes and tools. 58 Since there is no known method to make the 
nuclear end products harmless other than the passage of time, dis-
posal of these wastes actually entails the long-term storage of the 
contaminated materials.58 The time periods required are immense: 
some high level wastes must be isolated from the environment for 
thousands of years.80 Proposed methods for disposing of high level 
wastes include depositing the material in deep salt formations or in 
the sea bed, shooting it into space,81 and placing the wastes in sur-
face depositories. 82 All of the proposals involve difficult technical 
problems83 and, as yet, no acceptable method of waste disposal has 
been found. 84 
At present, the spent fuel rods containing the high level waste 
from most commercial reactors are left in "temporary" storage in 
cooling tanks on the reactor sites.85 These on-site storage facilities 
are rapidly filling up, and many power plants may have to suspend 
operations in the 1980's absent the development of other storage 
facilities. 88 Consequently, the nuclear power industry has pressured 
the government to develop permanent storage facilities, and many 
people both in and out of the government have recommended that 
financial problems and fear of terrorism. Jakimo and Bupp, Nuclear Waste Disposal, Not in 
My Backyard, TECH. REv. 64, 64-66 (March/April 1978). See also Bleviss, Nuclear Power, A 
Position Paper by the Scientific Staff of the Massachusetts Audubon Society, 18 MASS. 
AUDUBON 3, 6-7 nn. 25-28 (April 1979). 
" LAPORTE, supra note 54, at 412. 
58 ODUM, supra note 53, at 465. 
5. NRDC v. NRC, 547 F.2d 633, 637 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1976) . 
• 0 [d. at 638. Plutonium is among the most toxic of the waste materials. With a half life of 
25,000 years, it must be isolated from the biosphere for 250,000 years. As a comparison, 
Neanderthal man appeared about 75,000 years ago. [d. at 652 n.54 . 
. " Jakimo & Bupp, supra note 56, at 67-70 . 
.. NRDC v. NRC, 547 F.2d 633,648 (D.C. Cir. 1976). This was the method of waste storage 
proposed by the Commission at the fuel cycle rulemaking hearings. [d. 
13 See, e.g., Baffey, Radioactive Waste Site Search Gets into Deep Water, 190 SCI. 361 (Oct. 
24, 1975). The major technical difficulties of waste disposal result from the tremendous heat 
produced by the decaying radioactive materials and the chemical reactions that take place 
between the wastes and the containment vessel. Jakimo & Bupp, supra note 56, at 70-71. 
.. See COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 377-79 (1978) . 
.. Jakimo & Bupp, supra note 56, at 66 . 
.. [d. 
/ 
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no nuclear plants be licensed until the waste disposal problem is 
solved.'7 
B. The Vermont Yankee Licensing 
The first issue presented by the Commission and the Court of 
Appeals to the Supreme Court concerned whether the Commission 
could have properly issued the Vermont Yankee nuclear plant li-
cense without considering the environmental impact of spent fuel 
reprocessing and waste disposal. In upholding the license, the Ap-
peal Board had decided that the impact was too speculative,68 and 
could be more appropriately considered in the licensing of reprocess-
ing and waste disposal facilities.·' The Appeals Court, however, re-
jected these arguments, reasoning that NEP A requires the Commis-
sion to predict future impacts70 and that, since nuclear wastes pose 
a serious threat to the environment, postponing consideration of 
their effects would only perpetuate the "incremental decisionmak-
ing"71 that NEPA was intended to end.72 Therefore, the Appeals 
Court reversed the granting of the Vermont Yankee license, holding 
that the Commission must consider the environmental effects of the 
back end of the fuel cycle in a licensing proceeding.73 
.7 See, e.g., N.Y. Times, April 16, 1978, at 34, col. 1. An account of the consequences of 
the failure to consider the long term problems of nuclear waste disposal was pre~ented in 
Lester & Rose, The Nuclear Wastes at West Valley, New York, TECH. REv. 20 (May 1977). 
The privately owned West Valley fuel reprocessing plant was closed in 1972, leaving 600,000 
gallons of high level radioactive wastes stored in a buried steel tank. The authors described 
the situation graphically: 
It is estimated that 85 percent of all the radioactivity in the carbon steel tank at West 
Valley is contained in about 30,000 gallons of sludge at the bottom .... No satisfactory 
way to remove the sludge has been developed; it cannot be re-dissolved in nitric acid 
without dissolving the tank also. Furthermore, steelwork protruding into the tank floor 
will interfere with attempts to remove the sludge hydraulically or mechanically; access 
to the tank is limited to a few small holes in the roof, and the sludge itself is, of course, 
highly radioactive. Yet the wastes cannot be left indefinitely in its present form because 
the carbon steel tank will eventually corrode. 
[d. The authors characterized the mistake as the product of inadequate technological assess-
ment and a management philosophy marked by a lack of concern for future problems. Id. at 
23 . 
.. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp., 4 AEC 930, 938 (1972). 
II [d. at 936. 
7. NRDC v. NRC, 547 F.2d 633, 639-40 (D.C. Cir. 1976). 
71 [d. at 640. 
72 [d. 
7. [d. at 641. The Appeals Court did say that this consideration may be accomplished 
through rulemaking proceedings, rather than the Commission's considering the fuel" cycle 
impact for each plant at the individual licensing hearing. [d. 
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Rather than address the question as framed by the prior proceed-
ings, the Supreme Court instead rephrased the issue. The interven-
ors had successfully convinced the Court of Appeals that the Ver-
mont Yankee license was invalid because the Commission had re-
fused to consider the back end of the fuel cycle, thereby contraven-
ing NEPA. The Supreme Court, however, dismissed this issue as no 
longer present in the case.74 Instead, the Supreme Court decided 
that the actual issue concerned whether the Commission may 
consider the back end of the fuel cycle in a licensing proceeding.75 
Reasoning that radioactive wastes do create adverse environmental 
effects, it held that the Commission could consider waste disposal 
and fuel reprocessing in the licensing hearing.78 The Court justified 
this analysis on two grounds. First, it explained that the issue had 
changed because of the Commission's decision, after the Vermont 
Yankee licensing, to consider the back end of the fuel cycle in subse-
quent plant licensings.77 However, the Commission's change in posi-
tion was irrelevant to the question of the validity of the Vermont 
Yankee license; the agency's later announcement that it would con-
sider fuel reprocessing and waste disposal in future licensing hear-
ings certainly had no effect on its failure to comply with NEPA in 
past licensing proceedings. Second, the Court rationalized its failure 
to question the validity of the Vermont Yankee license by referring 
to the Commission's conclusion, based on the results of the later fuel 
cycle rulemaking proceedings, that the environmental impact of the 
fuel cycle would be "relatively insignificant."78 However, since the 
rule making itself was also challenged, and, as the Court acknowl-
edged, could be vacated on remand,79 its findings cannot be used 
to support the upholding of the Vermont Yankee license.so 
Giving an agency broad discretion in determining those factors 
that it may consider in a licensing proceeding, especially after the 
" Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519, 538 (1978). 
75 [d. 
" [d. 
77 [d. 
,. [d. 
" [d. at 549. If the rulemaking is vacated.on remand, the Vermont Yankee license will 
remain effective, and the Commission may still refuse to consider fuel reprocessing and waste 
disposal in subsequent proceedings, since the Court decided only that the Commission may, 
not that it must, consider the back end of the fuel cycle . 
.. The Court evidently did not consider the absurdity of allowing the Commission to com-
mit itself to an action, and only afterwards to decide whether the effects of that action may 
be harmful. 
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Court recognized that nuclear wastes create "adverse environmen-
tal effects,"8! is clearly inconsistent with NEPA's mandate. By over-
looking the Commission's failure to consider the back end of the fuel 
cycle at the Vermont Yankee licensing, the Court has indicated 
that it will accept agency procedures that are far below the "strict 
standards of compliance"82 with NEPA long required by the lower 
federal courts. 
C. The Fuel Cycle Rulemaking 
As an alternative to determining the fuel cycle effects of each 
plant at individual licensing proceedings,83 the Commission held an 
informal rulemaking proceeding over a year after the Vermont Yan- . 
kee licensing in order to assess the environmental impact of the fuel 
cycle of a model light water reactor.84 The Commission intended 
that the analysis produced at the rulemaking would be incorporated 
into the cost-benefit study conducted for all similar reactors.85 The 
Commission published notice of the rule making proceeding88 and 
allowed interested parties an opportunity to present comments, ful-
filling the requirements for informal rule making established by the 
Administrative Procedure Act (APA). 87 It did not permit the use of 
cross-examination and discovery. 88 
NRDC appealed the Commission's refusal to use trial-like proce-
dures at the rulemaking hearing, contending that the decision de-
nied them an opportunity to participate meaningfully in the pro-
ceedings.8• Since the Court of Appeals had upheld NRDC's position, 
the issue before the Supreme Court, therefore, was whether a court 
may demand procedures beyond those specified in the APA for an 
informal rule making proceeding. The Supreme Court held that a 
court may not require additional procedures, reasoning that the 
possibility of such judicial action would infringe upon the agency's 
8. Id. at 539. 
82 Calvert Cliffs Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1112 (D.C. Cir. 1971). 
83 37 Fed. Reg. 24,191, 24,192 (1972) . 
.. 39 Fed. Reg. 14,188, 14,191 (1974) . 
.. 37 Fed. Reg. 24,191, 24,193 (1972) . 
.. Id. 
87 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1976). The Commission actually went beyond the APA minimum proce-
dures for informal rulemaking by allowing the parties to make oral as well as written com-
ments and by having the hearing board question parties offering comments. 39 Fed. Reg. 
14,188 (1974) . 
.. 39 Fed. Reg. 14,188-14,189 (1974) . 
.. NRDC v. NRC, 547 F.2d 633, 643 (D.C. Cir. 1976). 
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discretion to choose its own procedures.Do Under the Court's hold-
ing, a reviewing court may determine only whether the administra-
tive proceedings provided a sufficient substantive basis for the rule 
and may not investigate whether additional procedures beyond the 
APA minimum are necessary. 
In this analysis, the Supreme Court followed the traditional ad-
ministrative law distinction between rule making and adjudication, 
as set forth in the Administrative Procedure Act. Rulemaking is the 
process whereby an agency establishes a policy having a future ef-
fect. D1 It closely resembles legislative decisionmaking. For example, 
in rulemaking an agency, like a legislature, is not limited by due 
process requirements for a hearing or adherence to the rules of evi-
dence. Furthermore, absent a specific statutory provision to the 
contrary, evidence need not be presented on the record. D2 Rulemak-
ing hearings seek only to permit public input into the agency's deci-
sionmaking, and not to provide a forum for parties to resolve factual 
disputes. 93 Therefore, the agency may rule on the basis of informa-
tion other than that presented by the parties.D4 In order to J1rovide 
uniform and streamlined rulemaking procedures, D5 the APA requires 
only that the agency gi.ve notice of a proposed rulemaking,96 allow 
for interested parties to comment on the proposal,97 and generally 
explain the basis and purpose of any rule adopted.98 On the other 
hand, in adjudication the agency applies existing rules to past or 
present facts. 99 An agency holding an adjudicatory proceeding acts 
.. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519, 544 (1978). The Court 
stated that the only exceptions to this principle might arise where the rule making affect~d a 
small number of people individually, so that the effect of the proceedings is essentially 
judicial rather than legislative, or where the procedures represent an unjustified change from 
the agency's established practices. [d. at 542. 
" 5 U.S.C. §§ 551(4), (5) (1976). 
" 1 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 458 (1978). The requirement that evidence be 
presented on the record distinguishes formal rule making from informal rulemaking. See 5 
U.S.C. § 553(c) (1976). Where a statute requires that the rule be made on the record after 
opportunity for a hearing, the APA's adjudicatory provisions, 5 U.S.C. §§ 555, 556 (1976), 
apply. Vermont Yankee concerned an informal rulemaking proceeding . 
.. NRDC v. NRC, M7 F.2d 633, 656 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (Bazelon, J., concurring) . 
.. B. SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 164 (1976) . 
.. 1 B. MEZINES, J. STEIN & J. GRUF, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW §§ 1.04[3]-[4] (1977) . 
.. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (1976). 
" [d. § 553(c). The agency does not have to allow oral comments at public hearings. Id . 
.. [d . 
.. SCHWARTZ, supra note 94, at 144. The APA defines adjudication to include any agency 
disposition other than rulemaking, and to include licensing proceedings. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551(6), 
(7) (1976). 
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in a judicial role and, therefore, is subject to procedural due process 
requirements. loo In addition, because of the importance of accurate 
fact finding in adjudication, such adversarial procedures as cross-
examination are used. lol 
The APA requires different standards of judicial review for adju-
dication and rulemaking. To uphold the result of an adjudicatory 
proceeding, a court must have substantial evidence on the hearing 
record supporting the agency's decision. lo2 Review of informal rule-
making, however, cannot use the same standard, since the agency 
does not have to hold a hearing. Instead, the court looks outside of 
the hearing record to determine if the agency rule is "arbitrary, 
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance 
with law."lo3 Nevertheless, in both situations, the court must review 
the agency's action on its merits. lo4 
In Vermont Yankee, the Supreme Court adhered strictly to the 
APA scheme, ruling that the statutorily mandated review was ex-
clusive. los Consequently, a court could not reverse the fuel cycle 
rulemaking because of its perceived inadequate procedures, since 
the APA demanded no more procedures than those in fact provided. 
Such an analysis sharply contrasts with that used by the lower 
court. 
The Court of Appeals rejected the "bright line" distinction '06 that 
the APA draws between rule making and adjudication. ,o7 According 
to Judge Bazelon, the distinction between rule making and adjudi-
cation has broken down because agencies have expanded the use of 
rule making into fact-intensive areas previously reserved for adjudi-
cation. los For example, the fuel cycle rulemaking proceeding focused 
on technical fact findinglO9 and concerned an issue that the agency 
could have considered in an adjudicatory licensing hearing contain-
'00 Londoner v. Denver, 210 U.S. 373, 386 (1908). 
10' 5 U.S.C. § 556(d) (1976). See Wright, The Courts and the Rulemaking Process: The 
Limits of Judicial Review, 59 CORNELL L. REv. 375, 379 (1974). 
It. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (1976). 
'03 [d. § 706(2)(A). The Appeals Court named three areas to which the reviewing court must 
look for support of the fuel cycle rule: the EIS, its backup documentation, and the testimony 
offered at the hearing. NRDC v. NRC, 547 F.2d 633, 646 (D.C. Cir. 1976). 
, .. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (1976). 
'05 Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519, 547-58 (1978). 
, .. NRDC v. NRC, 547 F.2d 633, 655 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (Bazelon, J., separate statement). 
10' [d. See also Duquesne Light Co. v. EPA, 481 F.2d I, 5-6 (3rd Cir. 1973). 
'08 NRDC v. NRC, 547 F.2d 633, 656 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (Bazelon, J., separate statement). 
'" [d. at 656 n.3. 
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ing adequate procedural safeguards. 110 Since such an issue does not 
fit neatly into either the adjudicatory or rule making category, Judge 
Bazelon argues that a new "hybrid" procedure has evolved. III This 
hybrid procedure involves rules suitable for rulemaking, but also 
requires accurate fact finding more appropriate for adjudicatory 
proceedings. 112 
The Court of Appeals remanded that part of the fuel cycle rule 
concerning waste disposal and reprocessing to the Commission, 
holding that the agency's procedures at the rulemaking proceeding 
were insufficient to "ventilate" those issues. 113 The Court of Appeals 
perceived its role as insuring that the agency had provided the par-
ties "genuine opportunities to participate in a meaningful way,"114 
and that the agency had taken a "hard 100k"1l5 at the major ques-
tions. The Commission failed to do this on the waste disposal issue, 
basing the part of the rule dealing with waste disposal on the vague, 
110 Brief for Appellees at 48, Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519 
(1978). NRDC argued that the agency should allow in the rule making hearing many of the 
adjudicatory procedures that would have been used if the issue were considered in a licensing 
hearing . 
• i. NRDC v. NRC, 547 F.2d 633, 656 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (Bazelon, J., separate statement). 
112 It is on this point that Judge Bazelon differs from Judge Wright. Judge Wright does not 
recognize hybrid rulemaking as differing from traditional rulemaking. Rather, he sees rule-
making as involving policy decisions, where the reviewing court should not question the 
accuracy of the agency's conclusions as long as it gave a good faith consideration to all the 
factors. Therefore, he does not consider additional procedures to be necessary. Wright, supra 
note 101, at 391-94. 
113 NRDC v. NRC, 547 F.2d 633, 643 (D.C. Cir. 1976). Some of the parties disagreed with 
the Court's interpretation of the Appeals Court's holding, and the Supreme Court even 
expressed some doubt whether it was interpreting the holding correctly. Vermont Yankee 
Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519, 541 (1978). The alternative interpretation-
that the Appeals Court reversed the rulemaking on the basis of an inadequate record, rather 
than for insufficient procedures - was argued by the United States initially, Brief for the 
Federal Respondents in Opposition to the Grant of Certiorari at 9, and by NRDC, NRDC 
Brief in Opposition to a Petition for the Writ of Certiorari at 4. Several of the Appeals Court's 
comments support this alternate interpretation, as when it referred to the vague testimony 
of the Commission's main witness as providing "an insufficient record to sustain a rule 
limiting consideration of the environmental effects of nuclear waste disposal .... " NRDC 
v. NRC, 547 F.2d 633, 653 (D.C. Cir. 1976). The Supreme Court acknowledged that the 
Appeals Court may have considered the rulemaking record to be inadequate when it re-
manded the issue to the lower court. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 485 
U.S. 519, 549 (1978). The Court of Appeals, however, labelled the major question to be 
"whether the procedures provided by the agency were sufficient to ventilate the issues," 
NRDC v. NRC, 547 F.2d 633, 643 (D.C. Cir. 1976), and Judge Bazelon in his separate 
statement discussed why a focus on agency procedures was necessary. [d. at 655-57 . 
• " NRDC v. NRC, 547 F.2d 633, 644 (D.C. Cir. 1976). 
115 [d. 
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unsubstantiated testimony of a Commission scientistl18 without giv-
ing the intervenors any opportunity to challenge that testimony. 117 
To remedy these deficiencies, the Appeals Cqurt ordered the Com-
mission to provide procedures giving intervenors greater participa-
tion in the rulemaking proceeding, in order to create a "genuine 
dialogue"118 that could develop the issues.1I9 
Judge Bazelon's procedural review of "hybrid rule making" does 
not conform to the APA's standard for review of agency rulemaking, 
and rests instead on his conclusion that judges are "institutionally 
incompetent"l20 to weigh evidence, even to make an "arbitrary and 
capricious" determination, in rulemaking proceedings involving 
highly technical and complex areas. 12I Consequently, since a court 
does not possess sufficient knowledge to evaluate the merits of 
agency decisions involving technical subjects, it must rely on a re-
view of the agency's procedures. 122 The court needs the flexibility to 
require additional rule making procedures in order to insure that the 
participants in the proceedings have sufficient opportunities to 
challenge the agency's findings. 123 Only in this way can the review-
ing court guarantee that the issues are fully developed. 124 The APA, 
with its minimum notice and comment procedures and limited re-
view, does not provide that flexibility. Therefore, rather than re-
maining constrained by the APA, the reviewing court must be free 
to modify judicially the outmoded standards. 
Environmental cases especially warrant this judicial revision, 
both because of the nature of the subject and the reaction of many 
agencies to environmental concerns. As one judge commented, the 
'" Id. at 647-51, 653. 
117 Id. at 653-54. 
118 Id. at 653. The Court of Appeals suggested several procedures that the Commission 
could use to create a "genuine dialogue," including formal conferences between intervenors 
and staff, discovery, funding independent research by the intervenors, surveys of existing 
literature, memoranda explaining the Commission's methodology, as well as cross-
examination. Id. 
"lId. at 654. 
'20 Id. at 657 (Bazelon, J., separate statement). 
'2' Id. at 656-57. In International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir. 
1973), Judge Bazelon explained why he did not consider himself qualified to review the merits 
of the agency's decisions: "I recognize that 1 do not know enough about dynamometer extrap-
olations, deterioration factor adjustments, and the like to decide whether or not the govern-
ment's approach to these matters was statistically valid." Id. at 651 (Bazelon, J., concurring). 
'22 NRDC v. NRC, 547 F.2d 633, 657 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (Bazelon, J., separate statement). 
'23 Id. at 644. 
, .. Id. at 655-57 (Bazelon, J., separate statement). 
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structure of the agency decision making process works against envi-
ronmental interests. 125 Agency bias against environmental protec-
tion, or at least agency inertia or shortsightedness, as reflected in 
agency procedures making intervenor participation unnecessarily 
difficult,126 have prevented environmental matters from receiving 
the consideration that NEPA demands.127 In addition, the limited 
resources of most public interest groups, as compared to those of 
parties having an economic stake in the agency proceedings, 12K often 
limits their role to contesting the presentations of industrial partici-
pants. 129 Consequently, in a proceeding like the fuel cycle rulemak-
ing, where the parties cannot cross-examine or otherwise directly 
challenge the testimony of other parties, public interest groups may 
have little input. Since a reviewing court considers the hearing re-
cord, among other things, in determining whether an agency deci-
sion meets the APA's arbitrary and capricious standard,.30 the ina-
bility of a party opposing the agency to present its arguments efIec-
tively in the rulemaking proceeding creates a one-sided picture on 
review. In contrast, by imposing additional procedures providing for 
greater participation in the rulemaking, a court can better insure 
that the agency will respond to the public interest group's views, J:lI 
and that a more complete picture of the positions on the issue is 
available on review. 
The APA's "arbitrary and capricious" standard ofreview does not 
assure accurate fact finding, because it requires only a finding of 
reasonableness and not an assessment of the accuracy of the rule-
125 Oakes, Developments in Environmen,tal Law, 3 ENVT'L L. REP. 50001, 50008 (1973). 
12. See, e.g., Greene County Planning Bd. v. FPC, 455 F.2d 412,417 n.12 (2d Cir. 1972); 
Davis, Citizens' Guide to Intervention in Nuclear Power Plant Siting: A Blueprint for Alice 
in Nuclear Wonderland, 6 ENVT'L. L. 621, 655-70 (1976). 
127 See Green, Cost-Risk-Benefit Assessment and the Law: Introduction and Perspective, 
45 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 901 (1977); Sax, The (Unhappy) Truth About NEPA, 26 OKLA. L. REV. 
239 (1973). . 
'" Stoel, Environmental Decision-Making by Federal Agencies, 4 ENVT'L. L. REP. 50128, 
50129 (1974). 
'29 NRDC v. NRC, 539 F.2d 824, 834 (2d Cir. 1976). 
13. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1976). See text at notes 102-04, supra. 
13' The NRC and its predecessor, the AEC, have not always been noted for their willingness 
to disclose information or to respond to outside comments. See Scientists Inst. for Pub. 
Information v. AEC, 481 F.2d 1079, 1098 n.78 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Lester & Rose, The Nuclear 
Wastes at West Valley, New York, TECH. REV. 20 (May 1977). Of the AEC's role in the West 
Valley fiasco, the authors commented, "the AEC generally responded to queries as briefly as 
possible, and volunteered even less," even though the AEC knew of the potential problems. 
Id. at 23. 
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making conclusions. 132 Although this standard of review may be 
appropriate for traditional rulemaking, where the agency decides 
policy questions by balancing competing interests, environmental 
cases, where the subject matter is complex and the results of the 
agency decision can greatly affect the public health, require a more 
demanding form of review.133 Lower federal courts have long sub-
jected agency procedures under NEPA to especially strict scru-
tiny.134 The Court of Appeals' decision that the traditional method 
was not sufficient to insure the appropriate scrutiny, and that addi-
tional procedures may be required in rulemaking, was a logical de-
velopment from that strict standard. 
The result from the point of view of the agency officials may be 
the same whether the court reverses the agency's decision for an 
inadequate record or for inadequate procedures. Either way, the 
administrator knows that the agency's procedures were not suffi-
cient to produce an adequate record. 135 By adding procedural review 
to its arsenal, however, the court gains the flexibility of an addi-
tional method for reviewing complex materials. 
Hybrid procedural review, however, has not gone uncriticized. 
One criticism asserts that the use of procedural review will disrupt 
the rule making process by requiring the agency to graft trial-type 
procedures onto the rulemaking proceeding. 136 While the Appeals 
Court suggested several nonadversarial techniques the Commission 
could use on remand,137 and avoided specifying any that the Com-
misson must use,138 most writers have interpreted procedural review 
as requiring the use of cross-examination. 139 Prior opinions by Judge 
Bazelon lend support to this interpretation. 140 If the Commission 
does allow cross-examination, the resulting emphasis on adversarial 
132 B. SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw 152 (1976). 
133 NRDC v. NRC, 547 F.2d 633, 657 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (Bazelon, J., separate statement). 
134 E.g., Wyoming Outdoor Coordinating Council v. Butz, 484 F.2d 1244, 1249 (lOth Cir. 
1973). 
135 NRDC v. NRC, 547 F.2d 633, 657 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (Bazelon, J., separate statement); 
Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 PA. L. REv. 1267, 1314 (1975). 
'36 Wright, Court of Appeals Review of Federal Regulatory Agency Rulemaking, 26 AD. L. 
REV. 199, 207-08 (1974). 
137 NRDC v. NRC, 547 F.2d 633, 653 (D.C. Cir. 1976). See note 118, supra. 
138 NRDC v. NRC, 547 F.2d 633, 644 (D.C. Cir. 1976). 
'30 See generally, Williams, "Hybrid Rulemaking" under the Administrative Procedure 
Act: A Legal and Empirical Analysis, 42 U. CHI. L. REv. 401 (1975). 
'40 E.g., Friends of the Earth v. AEC, 485 F.2d 1031, 1033 (D.C. Cir. 1973); International 
Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615,652 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (Bazelon, J., concurring). 
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tactics may not promote the exchange of information that the Ap-
peals Court envisioned. 141 
A second criticism of allowing a court to require additional proce-
dures contends that judicial review would become totally unpredict-
able because the agency could not know what procedures a review-
ing court might require. 142 Consequently, the agency would have to 
anticipate possible judicial review by using full adjudicatory proce-
dures in all hearings, since that constitutes the only wayan agency 
could guarantee enough opportunities for participation and thereby 
avoid reversal by the court. Such a result would force the agency 
away from what, in its expertise, it considers to be the best proce-
dure and would result in costly delays.143 
Third, some lower federal court judges have disputed Judge Baze-
lon's conclusion that procedural review is necessary in order to com-
pensate for a judge's inability to understand complex, technical 
material. Judge Oakes, of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, 
views the judge's lack of technical expertise as an advantage. 144 Be-
cause a judge cannot understand the technical language, agency 
experts are forced to explain their decisions in layman's terms. Con-
sequently, not only the judge but the public, which must ultimately 
pay the costs, can understand the agency's decision. 145 On the other 
hand, Judges Leventhal and Wright, of the Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia, consider judges capable of mastering techni-
cal information,148 at least to the extent necessary to determine 
whether an agency decision was arbitrary or capricious. 147 In either 
event, procedural review is not needed to compensate for judicial 
inexpertise. However, although all the named judges are exception-
ally capable and have demonstrated a knowledge of and sensitivity 
'" Williams, supra note 139, at 443-45. 
14' Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519, 546 (1978); Wright, supra 
note 136, at 207. 
'43 See Brief of the Pacific Legal Foundation at 3, Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. 
v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519 (1978); Murphy, The National Environmental Policy Act and the 
Licensing Process: Environmentalist Magna Carta or Agency Coup de Grace, 72 COLUM. L. 
REV. 963, 969 (1972) . 
... Oakes, Substantial Judicial Review in Environmental Law, 7 ENVT'L L. REP. 50029, 
50031 (1977). 
'" Id. 
'48 Wright, supra note 136, at 199-200. 
,<7 Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d I, 68-69 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (Leventhal, J., concurring); 
Friends of the Earth v. AEC, 485 F.2d 1031, 1034-35 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (Leventhal, J., concur-
ring). 
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towards environmental problems, other federal judges may not 
share their ability or concern. Yet even that added fact does not 
necessarily warrant the use of procedural review. As Judge Wright 
suggested, such judges would probably be no more competent to 
evaluate agency procedures in order to determine whether an issue 
is fully "ventilated" than they are to weigh the substantive merits 
of a decision. us If that conclusion is true, procedural review will be 
no more effective than the substantive review under the APA's arbi-
trary and capricious standard. 
In sum, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia and the 
Supreme Court treated the fuel cycle rule making problem in com-
pletely different manners. The Appeals Court wanted to insure that 
the Commission gave the full consideration to the environmental 
impact of the fuel cycle that NEPA required. The court reasoned 
that this result could be reached by granting the parties greater 
opportunities for participating in the rulemaking proceedings than 
those required by the AP A for informal rulemaking. 149 In ordering 
the Commission to change its procedures, the Appeals Court refused 
to conform the procedures it required to the traditional rulemaking 
and adjudication "cubbyholes"150 of the APA. Rather, it adopted a 
flexible approach, permitting the modification of its review accord-
ing to the nature of the proceedings. Because the fuel cycle rulemak-
ing was a "hybrid" proceeding, the court required procedures be-
yond mere notice and comment in order to insure a full exploration 
of the fuel cycle impact. 151 
Failing to show the same concern for the environmental hazards 
of nuclear power, the Supreme Court denied that NEPA had any 
effect on the standard of review. 152 Instead, the Court rejected the 
flexible approach of the lower court, remanding the case to the 
Appeals Court to conduct a review of the rulemaking according to 
the "arbitrary and capricious" standard set forth in the APA.153 The 
Supreme Court sought to insure that a reviewing court would not 
interfere with either the legislative scheme for judicial review or 
'" Wright, The Courts and the Rulemaking Process: The Limits of Judicial Review, 59 
CORNELL L. REV. 375, 393 (1974) . 
... NRDC v. NRC, 547 F.2d 633, 653 (D.C. Cir. 1976). 
'''' Mobil Oil Corp. v. FPC, 483 F.2d 1238, 1252 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
'" NRDC v. NRC, 547 F.2d 633, 644 (D.C. Cir. 1976). 
'" Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519, 548 (1978). 
1S3 [d. at 548-49. 
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with the agency's discretion to establish its own procedures. 154 That 
the Court should view the issue this way is not surprising. Justice 
Rehnquist in particular has argued that courts should not question 
the wisdom of congressional decisions. 155 
The Supreme Court's reliance on the APA and the traditional 
analysis of rule making, though, is unfortunate. The distinction be-
tween adjudication and rulemaking was never clearcut, and it be-
comes increasingly blurred when an agency uses rulemaking to 
make technical decisions when facts rather than policy judgments 
are controlling. lSI As a result, especially in NEPA cases, judicial 
review may be ineffective in insuring the accuracy of the agency's 
results. The Supreme Court had an opportunity to consider whether 
the APA distinction is outmoded and, by fashioning a flexible rem-
edy, to bring congressional attention to the problem. The Court's 
failure even to acknowledge any problem makes legislative consider-
ation unlikely. 
m. THE MIDLAND LICENSING 
A. The Midland Environmental Impact Statement and the 
Threshold Test 
The next issue faced by the Court resulted from a protracted 
dispute over the Commission's exclusion of energy conservation 
from the environmental impact statement (EIS) written for Con-
sumers Power Company's Midland plant. Saginaw, the intervenors 
in the licensing, argued that the Midland EIS was defective because 
it did not include an examination of energy conservation as an alter-
native to the proposed plant. 157 The Licensing Board dismissed Sagi-
naw's energy conservation contentions as beyond the scope of its 
authority.158 The Appeal Board upheld the Licensing Board, reason-
ing that the proposed energy conservation alternatives did not meet 
a "rule of reason "IS8 used by the courts as the standard for determin-
ing the scope of alternatives to be considered in an EIS}61J Six 
, .. [d. at 544. 
'55 See, e.g., Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88,125 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissent-
ing). 
, .. For another detailed criticism of the rulemaking analysis in this case see 1 K. DAVIS, 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 605-16 (1978). 
'57 Aeschliman v. NRC, 547 F.2d 622, 625 (D.C. Cir. 1976) . 
.. , Consumers Power Co., 5 AEC 214, 223 (1972). 
'5' Consumers Power Co., 6 AEC 331, 352 (1973). 
'10 See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Morton, 510 F.2d 813, 819 (5th Cir. 1975); NRDC v. Morton, 
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months later, the Commission ruled that the Licensing Board 
should not automatically bar evidence in support of energy conser-
vation from licensing proceedings. lSI In light of this decision, Sagi-
naw moved to reopen the Consumers Power proceedings. The Com-
mission, however, denied Saginaw's motion and set out a "threshold 
test"182 that a proposed alternative must meet in order to merit 
consideration. 183 Under this test, the intervenors must make an 
"affirmative showing" in support of their contentionl64 and the pro-
posed alternative must pass a three-pronged test for reasonable-
ness. 185 Since the Commission decided that the intervenors had 
failed to meet the affirmative showing requirement, it found that 
their contentions were properly excluded by the Licensing Board. 166 
The Court of Appeals, however, disagreed, holding that the Com-
mission's rejection of energy conservation on the basis of the thresh-
old test was arbitrary and capricious. ls7 
The Commission's proceedings present two questions. The first 
question concerns whether the Commission had independently to 
consider energy conservation in the Midland EIS. If so, the review-
ing court should have held the EIS to be defective, returned it to 
the agency for further development, and nullified the plant's li-
cense. 18K If the Commission did not have to consider the alternative 
independently, a second question arises: could the Commission still 
have excluded the alternative from the EIS when the intervenors 
specifically requested the agency to consider the issue. The Su-
preme Court answered both questions in favor of the Commission. 
In doing so, the Court departed significantly from the standards 
used by the lower courts in reviewing environmental impact state-
ments. 
1. The Midland EIS 
The Supreme Court held that the Midland environmental impact 
statement did not have to discuss energy conservation. The Court 
458 F.2d 827, 834 (D.C. Cir. 1972). 
'" Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 6 AEC 995 (1973). 
'" Consumers Power Co., 7 AEC 19, 24 (1974). 
'" [d. 
". [d. at 32. 
". [d. at 24. 
, .. [d. at 23. 
'" Aeschliman v. NRC, 547 F.2d 622, 629 (D.C. Cir. 1976). 
'" See, e.g., NRDC v. Calloway, 524 F.2d 79, 94-95 (2d Cir. 1975). 
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reasoned that the scope of required alternatives was an "evolving"'6U 
one, so that alternatives that might have to be considered when a 
court reviews the case may not have been required at the time of 
the plant licensing. Because energy conservation was not generally 
considered to be necessary in the early 1970's, 170 and since the Com-
mission had no evidence to indicate that conservation could lower 
the need for the new plant,17I the licensing board did not have to 
consider energy conservation as an alternative to the Midland 
plant. 172 
a. Prior Judicial Standards Governing Agency Consideration of 
Alternatives 
NEPAI73 requires that responsible federal officials contemplating 
"any major federal action significantly affecting the human envi-
ronment"174 prepare an EIS on the proposed action175 and include in 
it a discussion of possible alternatives to the action. 176 Under Com-
mission regulations, the Commission's staff prepares a draft EIS for 
a proposed plant based on the information available both in the 
utility's license application and from its own research.177 The staff 
must make this draft EIS available to interested parties before the 
licensing hearing. 178 In addition, the Commission must invite com-
ments on the draft EIS,179 although it does not have to hold a sepa-
rate hearing to receive those comments, and it must acknowledge 
responsible opposing views in the final impact statement. IMO After 
the Commission staff prepares the final EIS, the presiding officer 
reviews it to determine whether the Commission's NEPA review was 
adequate.'81 Whether the EIS for a project is sufficient and whether 
the agency action is supported by the record are separate questions. 
Consequently, a court may reverse the agency's decision on the basis 
'81 Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519, 552 (1978). 
170 [d. at 552. 
171 [d. at 553. 
172 [d. at 552-53. 
173 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-61 (1976). 
171 [d. § 4332(2)(C). 
175 [d. 
'78 [d. § 4332(2)(C)(iii). 
177 10 C.F.R. § 51.23 (1978). 
178 [d. § 51.24. 
17. [d. § 51.25. 
'80 [d. § 51.26(b). 
'8' [d. § 51.52. 
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of an inadequate EIS without reaching the merits of the final ac-
tion. 182 
NEPA does not define the scope of the alternatives that the 
agency must consider, beyond requiring that all "appropriate" al-
ternatives be studied.183 However, in Calvert Cliffs Coordinating 
Committee v. AEC,184 a case that has been called "the definitive 
judicial gloss on NEPA,"185 the Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia ruled that NEPA must be complied with "to the fullest 
extent possible."188 Other courts have applied this strict standard of 
compliance in determining what alternatives an agency must con-
sider. For example, the discussion of alternatives need not be ex-
haustive, but it must provide sufficient information to permit a 
"reasoned choice" of alternatives. 187 In addition, the agency's con-
sideration cannot be limited to alternatives within the scope of the 
agency's authorityl88 or to alternatives that would provide a com-
plete solution to or replacement for the proposed project. 189 The 
agency must also consider the alternative of taking no action. 1911 A 
case involving a coal fired generating plant shows the breadth of 
alternatives that can be required for a powerplant.191 There, the 
court found the EIS sufficient where it discussed the alternatives of 
providing no additional power, building on other sites, using such 
other fuels as nuclear power or gas, sharing other utilities' output, 
and implementing energy conservation measures. 192 
Nevertheless, the scope of the agency's consideration of alterna-
tives is not indefinite, but is limited by a "rule of reason. "193 The 
agency does not have to discuss "remote and speculative" alterna-
OM' Sierra Club v. Morton, 510 F.2d 813, 829 (5th Cir. 1975). 
"3 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(E) (1976). 
, .. 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971). 
"5 Anderson, NEPA and Federal Decision Making, 3 ENVT'L L. REP. 50099 (1973). 
'" Calvert Cliffs Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1115 (D.C. Cir. 1971). 
'" North Carolina v. FPC, 53. F.2d 702, 707 (D.C. Cir. 1976). 
, .. NRDC v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827, 834 (D.C. Cir. 1972). 
,,, [d. at 836. The appeals court in NRDC v. Morton explained: "If an alternative would 
result in supplying only part of the energy that the lease [of offshore drilling sites J would 
yield, then its use might possibly reduce the scope of the lease sale program and thus alleviate 
a significant portion of the environmental harm .... " [d. 
IV. Union of Concerned Scientists v. AEC, 499 F.2d 1069, 1084 n.37 (D.C. Cir. 1974); 
Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Engineers, 470 F.2d 289, 297 (8th Cir. 1972). 
19' Mason County Medical Ass'n. v. Knebel, 563 F.2d 256 (6th Cir. 1977). 
'" [d. at 263. 
IV3 Sierra Club v. Morton, 510 F.2d 813, 819 (5th Cir. 1975); NRDC v. Morton, 458 F.2d 
827, 834 (D.C. Cir. 1972). 
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tives,ls4 such as alternatives that would not be available to meet the 
need for which the proposal is designed. ID5 For example, a court has 
said that an EIS for the sale of offshore oil leases should have consid-
ered the alternatives of substituting nuclear power or changing oil 
import quotas, but that it did not have to consider the use of oil 
shale or tar sands, geothermal energy or coal gasification. 19ft In addi-
tion, an agency does not have to consider alternatives that the re-
cord does not indicate would be effective.197 Consequently, a court 
determined that the EIS for an airport runway extension was suffi-
cient where it discussed as alternatives only three different runway 
configurations and the no action alternative,ls8 but did not discuss 
methods of reducing traffic, such as increased landing fees or 
changed landing schedules, that might eliminate the need for the 
extension. ISS Moreover, although the agency has the obligation to 
consider alternatives and cannot rely on parties to propose them, 
the parties' comments do have a bearing on how detailed the analy-
sis of a specific alternative must be.20o Therefore, in a case involving 
a challenge to an agency's consideration of energy conservation, the 
court indicated that the agency's general discussion of energy con-
servation, without analyzing specific conservation techniques, was 
sufficient since the parties never brought specific techniques, such 
as peak pricing, to the agency's attention. 201 
b. The Effect of Vermont Yankee on the Scope of Alternatives 
The Supreme Court's analysis of the Commission's duty in pre-
paring the Midland EIS could restrict future compliance with the 
10. NRDC v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827, 838 (D.C. Cir. 1972). 
II. [d. 
"' [d. at 837. 
19' Life of the Land v. Brinegar, 485 F.2d 460, 471 (9th Cir. 1973). 
II. [d. at 470-71. 
, .. [d. But see Sax, The (Unhappy) Truth About NEPA, 26 OKLA. L. REv. 239 (1973). Sax 
analyzed why EIS's prepared for airport runway expansions usually address only a limited 
scope of alternatives. He observed that the typical airport EIS includes the alternatives of 
building a new airport elsewhere, building the proposed runway, or doing nothing, id. at 245, 
without considering less environmentally damaging and less costly alternatives such as using 
better scheduling and air traffic control techniques or limiting general aviation, even though 
these alternate methods have been shown to be effective, id. at 244. Sax concluded that 
bureaucratic inertia and agency self-interest prevented the agency from looking beyond the 
traditionally considered alternatives. [d. at 246-48. 
200 See, e.g., Aeschliman v. NRC, 547 F.2d 622,625 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1976); North Carolina v. 
FPC, 533 F.2d 702, 707 (D.C. Cir. 1976). 
20' North Carolina v. FPC, 533 F.2d 702, 707 (D.C. Cir. 1976). 
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spirit ofNEPA. For example, the Vermont Yankee Court considered 
energy conservation to have been an unfeasible alternative in the 
early 1970's and, therefore, beyond the scope of the Commission's 
required analysis. 202 The Court pointed out that before the 1973-74 
oil shortage the subject received "little serious thought in most gov-
ernment circles."203 However, the issue is not whether "most govern-
ment circles" were considering energy conservation, but whether the 
Commission should have considered it. In effect, the agency was 
allowed to avoid its obligation under NEPA because other agencies, 
which were under no similar obligation, also did not consider energy 
conservation. Only as an afterthought did the opinion indicate that 
after the oil shortage of 1973 and 1974 the agency would have to 
include energy conservation in an EIS.204 The Court's analysis seri-
ously limits the scope of alternatives discussed in an impact state-
ment, especially because the Court implied that agencies need not 
utilize foresight in preparing an EIS, as indicated by NEPA, but 
rather need only react to crises after they arise. 
Vermont Yankee also narrowed the Commission's scope of con-
cern under NEPA in another way. The Calvert Cliffs court ruled 
that "NEPA establishes environmental protection as an integral 
part of the Atomic Energy Commission's basic mandate.''205 This 
interpretation of the Commission's role reflected Congress's belief 
that federal agencies must be forced out of their narrow mission-
orientation if federal environmental protection measures are to suc-
ceed.208 The Supreme Court, in contrast, took a step backwards. 
202 Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519, 552 (1978). 
203 [d. Contrary to the Court's remarks, energy conservation was discussed before then. See, 
e.g., Remarks by President Nixon, 117 CONGo REc. 18049, 18052 (1971), and response by 
Senator Robison: "Lastly, I am especially pleased at the attention the President gave in his 
message to the developing need for energy conservation." [d. at 18054. 
The Court also reported that the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) did not promul-
gate its regulations specifying consideration of energy conservation in an EIS, 38 Fed. Reg. 
20,554 (1973), until over a year after the Commission prepared the Midland EIS. Vermont 
Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. V. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519, 552 (1978). The CEQ, however, pro-
posed those regulations in May of 1973, before the severe oil shortages were felt. 38 Fed. Reg. 
10,856, 10,859 (1973). Furthermore, the CEQ described the regulations as incorporating 
"much of NEPA's legal evolution in the courts over the last 2 years .... " THE COUNCIL ON 
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 234 (1973). The CEQ guidelines, therefore, 
should not have been used as a justification for the Commission's failure to consider energy 
conservation. 
2 .. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. V. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519, 552-53 (1978). 
206 Calvert Cliffs Coordinating Comm., Inc. V. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1119 (D.C. Cir. 1971). 
21M! See H.R. REp. No. 378, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 8, reprinted in [1969] U.S. CODE CONGo & 
AD. NEWS 2751, 2753-54. 
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Rather than accepting the Commission's dual mandate of nuclear 
regulation and environmental protection, the Court instead looked 
to the Commission's initial statutory role and found that "the Com-
mission's prime area of concern in the licensing context ... is 
national security, public health, and safety."207 The Court did ac-
knowledge that "NEPA, of course, has altered slightly the statutory 
balance ... ";288 however, its discussion indicates that future em-
phasis will be on the word "slightly." 
Perhaps most importantly, the Vermont Yankee decision could 
permit the Commission to abdicate its factfinding function to other 
agencies. Although NEPA does require that the agency preparing an 
EIS consult with other agencies with expertise in the area,20B it does 
not say that the agency should uncritically accept the opinions of 
others. Instead, NEPA clearly orders that the "responsible Federal 
official" study the environmental consequences and draft the envi-
ronmental impact statement.210 By limiting the Commission's area 
of concern, however, the Vermont Yankee decision indicates that 
the agency does not have to make as wide ranging an inquiry of 
alternatives as prior lower court cases have held to be necessary. In 
the litigation, the intervenors challenged the projections of demand 
for power that the Midland plant was designed to meet. The need 
for power, though, is determined by the state public utility commis-
sions,211 and therefore falls outside of the Commission's prime area 
of concern.212 Because NEPA only "slightly"213 alters that concern, 
the Court suggested that the Commission can accept the demand 
figures from the state agencies without making the rigorous evalua-
tion of them that the lower courts have required. Such deference to 
the findings of other agencies, in the place of independent analysis, 
defeats NEPA's purpose in having the responsible agency study the 
alternatives to a project. Other agencies to which the Commission 
would defer are unlikely to question whether the projected demand 
could be decreased by energy conservation, since their institutional 
focus centers on conventional uses of power. Furthermore, since 
.. , Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519, 550 (1978). 
208 [d. at 551. 
201 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1976). 
21. [d. 
211 Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519, 550 (1978), citing 42 
U.S.C. § 2021(k) (1976). 
212 Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519, 550 (1978). 
213 [d. at 551. 
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they are not the federal agency primarily responsible for the project, 
these other agencies do not have the same obligation under NEP A 
to consider alternatives. 214 As a consequence, the Commission 
should not be allowed to use the findings of other agencies as a 
reason for failing to explore fully the entire range of alternatives. 
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia had responded 
to a similar problem in Calvert Cliffs. 215 There, the plaintiffs chal-
lenged a Commission rule preventing a hearing board from consider-
ing an environmental issue, such as a project's effect on water qual-
ity, if the proposal satisfied the standards of the agency directly 
responsible for that issue,216 which, in the case of water quality, was 
a state agency. 217 Thus, under the rule, the Commission could defer 
to the determination of the other agency, even though that agency's 
concern was limited to whether the project complied with its stan-
dards and did not address either how the particular problem af-
fected the total cost-benefit analysis for the project or whether alter-
natives were available that could decrease the harm.21s In its deci-
sion, the Appeals Court rejected the rule as an abdication of the 
Commission's responsibility under NEPA.2lU By allowing the Com-
mission to rely on the determination of need made by other agen-
cies, Vermont Yankee has overturned that part of Calvert Cliffs, 
thereby emasculating NEPA's requirement that the agency respon-
sible for a project study all relevant alternatives. 
Although the Supreme Court recognized that an EIS is not in-
valid because it fails to discuss all possible alternatives "regardless 
of how uncommon or unknown, "220 the Court's use of this limitation 
further undermined the purpose of NEPA's requirement that alter-
natives be considered. In explaining why the Commission did not 
have to question the need for the Midland plant's power, the Court 
pointed out that the parties at the hearing thoroughly investigated 
the need "as that term is conventionally used."221 Saginaw's energy 
conservation contentions, however, were especially intended to show 
214 NEPA does require that all agencies in the federal government consider the environmen-
tal consequences and study alternatives to their proposed actions. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2) (1976). 
However, only the "responsible official" must prepare an EIS. Id. at § 4332(2)(C). 
215 Calvert Cliffs Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971). 
'" Id. at 1122-27. 
217 The Water Quality Improvement Act of 1970, 33 U.S.C. § 1171(b) (1970). 
21. Calvert Cliffs Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1123 (D.C. Cir. 1971). 
219 Id. 
220 Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519, 551 (1978). 
221 Id. at 550. 
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that the Commission should look beyond the conventional measure 
of need toward alternatives involving "uncommon" approaches. 
NEPA, as interpreted by the lower courts, requires that an agency 
look outside of its traditional area of expertise in exploring less 
environmentally damaging alternatives. 222 These courts have con-
sidered the requirement for a study of alternatives in an EIS to be 
important for NEPA's effectiveness because it both insures that the 
decision makers actually consider other methods of achieving the 
goals of a proposed action and permits outsiders to evaluate inde-
pendently other options to an action. 223 Yet this requirement of con-
sidering alternatives can only be effective if the agency actually 
makes a rigorous and independent study; the EIS loses its effect 
when the agency simply excludes alternatives that it has not pre-
viously considered as "uncommon," and then looks for support to 
other agencies that are unlikely to question its approach. By allow-
ing the Commission to rely on a conventional analysis of need, the 
Court condoned a catch-22 situation: a proposed "uncommon" al-
ternative that, if utilized, might reduce the demand for power need 
not be considered simply because it is uncommon. As a result, in-
stead of a rigorous independent study, the agency will merely pro-
duce self-serving statements that do not seriously question the 
agency's proposal.224 
2. The Threshold Test 
The Supreme Court found energy conservation to be an uncon-
ventional alternative not meriting independent consideration in the 
Midland EIS.225 The Court then had to decide whether the Commis-
sion could still exclude an unconventional alternative when the in-
tervenors requested that it be considered by the agency. The Com-
mission had upheld the Licensing Board's exclusion of Saginaw's 
energy conservation proposals because they failed to meet the 
agency's "threshold test."228 On appeal, the Supreme Court af-
firmed that decision, holding that the agency acted within its dis-
cretion in excluding the proposed alternative,227 notwithstanding the 
22, See, e.g., NRDC v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827, 834-35 (D.C. Cir. 1972). 
223 Sierra Club v. Morton, 510 F.2d 813, 825 (5th Cir. 1975). 
224 See, e.g., NRDC v. Calloway, 524 F.2d 79, 94 (2d Cir. 1975). 
225 Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519, 553-55 (1978). 
'28 Id. at 554. 
227 Id. 
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Commission's NEPA responsibilities.228 
The Commission stated a two-part test that a "novel"22u alterna-
tive raised by the intervenors must meet in order to warrant agency 
consideration. First, the intervenors must make an "affirmative 
showing"230 when raising the unconventional alternative. 231 Second, 
the proposed alternative itself must "relate to some action, methods 
or developments" that would make the proposed facility unneces-
sary,232 be "reasonably available,"233 and have an impact 
"susceptible to a reasonable degree of proof."234 Since the Supreme 
Court found that the intervenors had failed the "affirmative show-
ing" requirement, the Court never reached the second part of the 
test. By not distinguishing between the two parts of the test, how-
ever, the Court indicated approval of the entire threshold test. 235 
The Supreme Court endorsed the Commission's demand that the 
intervenors' showing in support of a proposed unconventional alter-
native be sufficient to require reasonable minds to inquire further. 236 
The Commission defined the requirements of this vague standard 
by its treatment of Saginaw's proposals. While the Commission 
acknowledged the presence of a "legitimate" energy conservation 
issue in Saginaw's contention that the utility's advertising stimu-
lated demand,237 it nevertheless ruled that the Licensing Board 
could exclude the issue because the intervenors offered no evidence 
supporting their contention.238 
The Court's approval of the Commission's demand for evidence 
to support a proposal shifts to the intervenors the burden of ascer-
taining whether a proposed alternative merits further agency con-
sideration. The Court of Appeals, following the traditional "rule of 
228 Id. at 553. 
221 Consumers Power Co., 7 AEC 19, 31 (1974). 
230 Id. at 32. 
231 Id. 
232 Id. at 24. 
233 Id. 
234 Id. 
2 .. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519, 554 (1978). The opinion 
emphasizes the intervenors' failure to present evidence supporting their proposals, id., sug-
gesting that the Court focused only on the affirmative showing requirement, without necessar-
ily approving of the second part of the threshold test. But the Court's general deference to 
the agency's procedures throughout Vermont Yankee and its failure to discuss specifically the 
elements of the threshold test indicate that the Court approved the entire test. 
234 Id. 
231 Consumers Power Co., 7 AEC 19, 25 (1974). 
mId. 
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reason" analysis, ruled that once the intervenors' comments 
"stimulate" the Commission's interest the Commission must inves-
tigate the alternative in order to determine whether it should be 
included in the EIS.238 Under this criterion, Saginaw's comments 
were sufficient because they identified "in a general way"240 the 
areas that it wanted explored.24! To emphasize that the agency, and 
not the intervenors, must investigate the alternative, the Appeals 
Court also required that the Commission explain its decision to give 
an alternative no additional consideration.242 This approach com-
plies with the Calvert Cliffs mandate that the agency take the initi-
ative in investigating the environmental costs of its actions.243 In 
contrast, the Supreme Court in Vermont Yankee turned the Calvert 
Cliffs command on its head. Instead of putting the burden on the 
agency to show that an alternative can be omitted from the EIS, the 
Supreme Court allowed the Commission to shift onto the interven-
ors the obligation of showing that an alternative meets the rule of 
reason before the agency need consider it. 
Requiring intervenors to produce an affirmative showing for a 
proposed alternative defeats the purpose of NEPA's mandate that 
the agency consider all appropriate alternatives.244 Intervenors' com-
ments are important because they force the agency to question its 
policies.245 Since the intervenors often lack the resources necessary 
to develop and present findings of fact,248 placing the burden of 
presenting evidence on them makes challenges to agency action 
difficult or impossible. The court in Calvert Cliffs sought to avoid 
this result, pointing out that "it is . . . unrealistic to assume that 
there will always be an intervenor with the information, energy and 
money required to challenge a staff recommendation which ignores 
environmental costs. "247 Recognizing this, courts have traditionally 
placed the burden of producing evidence on the agency, which has 
the resources to investigate alternatives. Such a procedure is espe-
... Aeschliman v. NRC, 547 F.2d 622, 628 (D.C. Cir. 1976) . 
••• Id. at 629 . 
... Id. 
"·Id . 
... Calvert Cliffs Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1119 (D.C. Cir. 1971) . 
... 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(E) (1976) . 
... Silva v. Lynn, 482 F.2d 1282, 1285 (1st Cir. 1973) . 
... Davis, Citizen's Guide to Intervention in Nuclear Power Plant Siting: A Blueprint for 
Alice in Nuclear Wonderland, 6 ENVT'L L. 621, 668-70 (1976) . 
• " Calvert Cliffs Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1118-19 (D.C. Cir. 
1971). 
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cially appropriate because the agency can then transfer the cost, 
through the license application process, to the applicant,24N the 
party directly benefiting from the action and therefore the one that 
logically should pay for the NEPA investigation. Instead, in 
Vermont Yankee the Supreme Court effectively shifted the investi-
gatory expense to the intervenor, a party having little or no hope of 
financial gain in the outcome and least able to bear the cost. 
The Commission used the second part of the threshold test to 
limit further the alternatives that it must consider. This part of the 
test contains a three-pronged requirement. However, the elements 
of this requirement are inconsistent with the standards concerning 
the scope of alternatives developed by earlier cases. Their affirm-
ance continues the erosion of NEPA's constraints on agency discre-
tion begun in the previous sections of the Vermont Yankee decision. 
The first element of the three-pronged test requires that a pro-
posed conservation alternative "relate to some action, methods or 
developments that would, in their aggregate effect, curtail demand 
for electricity to a level at which the proposed facility would not be 
needed."249 Such a "complete alternative" requirement conflicts 
with the holding in Natural Resources Defense Council v. Morton, 2511 
where the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia specifically 
rejected an agency's rule that a proposed alternative must provide 
a complete solution.251 There the court reasoned that an agency 
normally has more choices than going through with a project as 
planned or eliminating it completely; rather, the agency must also 
consider the alternative of conducting the project on a reduced scale 
and thereby satisfying part of the need while at the same time 
reducing the environmental harm.252 In the case of a nuclear power 
plant, reducing demand by energy conservation might allow the 
substitution of a smaller nuclear or fossil fuel plant. The Commis-
sion, however, rejected that analysis and forced the intervenors to 
demonstrate that energy conservation would be able to lower de-
mand to a level where existing facilities would be sufficient. If the 
intervenors failed that monumental task, it would not consider the 
alternative. 
24. See 10 C.F.R. § 51.20 (1978), which requires an applicant to file a report substantially 
similar to an EIS . 
... Consumers Power Co., 7 AEC 19, 24 (1974) . 
... 458 F.2d 827 (D.C. Cir. 1972) . 
• 51 [d. at 836. 
25. [d. 
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The second and third elements of the test require that the pro-
posed alternative be "reasonably available" and "susceptible to a 
reasonable degree of proof."253 Although the Commission's use of the 
qualifiers "reasonably" and "reasonable" suggests that its test con-
forms to the Natural Resources Defense Council v. Morton scope of 
alternatives standard, in reality the test is much stricter. According 
to the Commission, once the utility has established a "convincing" 
projection of energy demand, those alternatives that are "largely 
speculative" need not be considered.254 Moreover, once the Commis-
sion accepts the projected demand as valid or "convincing," it can 
exclude alternatives not totally meeting that demand as unreasona-
ble. In the Midland case, the Licensing Board decided that pro-
jected power demands were "convincing" and therefore that it did 
not have to consider energy conservation. In response to Saginaw's 
suggestion that limits be put on certain uses of electricity, the Li-
censing Board asserted that the estimated demand consisted of 
"normal industrial and residential use and it is . . . beyond our 
province to inquire into whether the customary uses being made of 
electricity in our society are 'proper' or 'improper.' "255 By using this 
analysis, the Licensing Board evaded the point of the intervenors' 
energy conservation contentions and therefore declined to consider 
whether the Commission could in fact decrease demand by reducing 
the "normal use" of electricity through conservation measures.256 
Since the utility had shown a "convincing" estimate of demand, 
and since the intervenors' energy conservation contentions aimed at 
reducing that projected normal demand, the Commission held that 
it could properly exclude energy conservation from consideration. 
Therefore, in effect, the Licensing Board only had to consider con-
253 Consumers Power Co., 7 AEC 19, 24 (1974). 
2 .. [d. 
255 Consumers Power Co., 5 AEC 214, 223 (1972). 
258 The Licensing Board explained its reasoning: 
[T]he Board is satisfied that the benefits outweigh the costs. The real question comes 
with respect to alternatives. Assuming that the power needs are to be met, are there better 
alternatives? The evidence demonstrates that there are not hydro sites available, that a 
pumped storage facility would not meet the local needs, that gas is not a viable alternative 
for the power use, and that outside sources are unavailable. . . . The question of alterna-
tives is then boiled down to a choice between nuclear and fossil (either oil or coal fuel) at 
the proposed location or at some other location. 
[d. at 226-27. Although it appears logical if the focus is on the agency's ability to meet the 
demand, the Licensing Board's analysis must be evaluated in light of the prior cases ordering 
agencies to consider alternatives outside of their authority to implement. See text at note 188, 
supra. 
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ventional supply-oriented alternatives, an unprecedented result 
under NEPA. 
By holding that the threshold test fell within the Commission's 
discretion, the Supreme Court extended the deference to agency 
procedures shown in its consideration of the fuel cycle rulemaking 
issue.257 In contrast, rather than deferring to agency discretion, the 
lower courts had uniformly demanded strict agency compliance 
with NEPA's procedural requirements in order to implement fully 
its mandate that federal agencies give environmental values full 
consideration.258 In the threshold test issue, by deferring to the 
agency's procedures, the Supreme Court has allowed the agency to 
determine ·its own standard of compliance with NEPA. Such a re-
sult justifies the concern of the lower courts. Where an agency can 
limit its consideration of alternatives by a test favoring the conven-
tional methods it' has already employed, its NEPA responsibilities 
are greatly decreased. 
B. The Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards Report 
The Supreme Court held that the report issued by the Advisory 
Committee on Reactor Safeguards on the Midland plant was ade-
quate even though the report's coverage of certain problems in the 
plant's design was vague and may not have been understandable by 
the public.25u The Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards con-
sists of experts appointed by the Commission to study and report 
on the hazards and safety standards of all proposed reactors. 260 The 
report issued on the Midland plant contained five single-spaced 
pages written "in language accessible to a determined layman. "281 
It discussed several problems in the design of the plant, concluding 
with a vague reference to certain "other problems" that the Advi-
sory Committee wanted resolved, but which it failed to identify 
other than by noting that they were cited in prior unidentified Advi-
sory Committee reports. 282 Despite the vague reference, the Court 
257 Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519, 542-45 (1978). See discus-
sion in text at notes 83-156, supra . 
... See, e.g., Greene County Planning Bd. v. FPC, 455 F.2d 412, 422(2d Cir. 1972) . 
... Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519, 556-57 (1978). 
". 42 U.S.C. § 2039 (1976). The Commission can issue a license over the Advisory Commit-
tee's disapproval, although it is unlikely to do so. Aeschliman v. NRC, 547 F.2d 622, 630 n.17 
(D.C. Cir. 1976). 
". Aeschliman v. NRC, 547 F.2d 622, 630 (D.C. Cir. 1976). 
'02 The report stated: "Other problems related to large water reactors have been identified 
19791 VERMONT YANKEE 661 
held that the report satisfied the Advisory Committee's responsibil-
ity to report on the plant hazards. 263 
In order to determine the Advisory Committee's responsibility, 
the Supreme Court looked to the legislative history of the act creat-
ing the Committee.284 Although the Advisory Committee has the 
dual role of providing technical advice to the Commission and in-
forming the public on reactor hazards, the Court concluded that its 
public informational role is secondary to its technical advisory 
role. 265 Since the Commission would have understood the reference 
to the "other problems," the report satisfied this advisory role. 
Thus, rather than describing all the reactor problems to the public, 
the report need only have given the reasons for the Committee's 
position on the proposed reactor.266 Consequently, even though the 
last paragraph was vague, it did not make the report fatally defec-
tive.287 
The Appeals Court did not share this interpretation of the role of 
the Advisory Committee. The lower court concluded that the Advi-
sory Committee's public informational and advisory roles were 
equal. 268 Therefore, the report had to go beYQnd merely providing the 
public with the Advisory Committee's position on the adequacy of 
the reactor safety standards, and instead also had to inform the 
public of the hazards of the plant so that concerned citizens could 
find out what problems might be "lurking" in a proposed reactor.26B 
The reference to the "other problems," while perhaps intelligible to 
the Commission, did not meet the requirement of informing the 
public. Consequently, the Appeals Court ordered the Commission 
by the Regulatory Staff and the ACRS and cited in previous ACRS reports. The Committee 
believes that resolution of these items should apply equally to the Midland Plant Units 1 & 
2." [d. 
"3 Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519, 556 (1978). 
, .. [d. 
". [d. 
'" [d. 
'" [d. The Court concluded that the Appeals Court "nullified" all the efforts of the Com-
mission in the licensing process because of a defect in a minor report, a result the Court 
considered "Kafkaesque." [d. at 557. While the Court's comment has an impressive literary 
ring, it is inaccurate. The Appeals Court did not nullify the Commission's efforts because of 
the Advisory Committee's report. Rather, it sent the report back for additional comments 
explaining the unidentified problems, after deciding to reverse on the threshold test issue. It 
is difficult to imagine how writing these comments would impose a heavy burden on a 
committee of nuclear power experts. 
'" Aeschliman v. NRC, 547 F.2d 622, 631 (D.C. Cir. 1976). 
'"~ [d. 
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to return the report to the Advisory Committee in order to add a 
short explanation of those problems in layman's language and to 
cross-reference its discussion to the prior reports referring to the 
problems.27o 
The Supreme Court's conclusion on the position of the Advisory 
Committee's public informational role is questionable. 271 Although 
the Advisory Committee's enabling statute272 is silent on how the 
Committee must balance its roles, a congressional committee report 
cited by both courts273 does indicate that Congress intended the 
Advisory Committee to provide the public with more than just the 
reason for its position on a reactor: 
The report of the committee is to be made public so that all concerned 
may be apprised of the safety or possible hazards of the facility. It is 
the belief of the. Joint Committee [on Atomic Energy] that when the 
public is adequately and accurately informed that it will be in a better 
position to accept the construction of any reactors.274 
It is true that the congressional report does not require that the 
Committee's report include either short explanations of problems in 
layman's language or cross-references to other reports, as ordered by 
the Appeals Court.275 Neither does it indicate that the Committee 
must deal "with every facet of nuclear energy in every report it 
issues, "278 which the Supreme Court, in a bit of hyperbole, suggests 
is the only alternative to its lower standard. The report does indi-
cate, however, that the Advisory Committee should issue its reports 
with the goal of fully informing the public of the hazards of a reac-
tor. The Appeals Court logically concluded that a report vaguely 
remarking on certain "other problems" of a reactor, without further 
explanation, was not written with enough regard towards furnishing 
the public with that information. 
The differences in the conclusions reached by the two courts on 
270 Id. at 631-32. 
271 The Court has been similarly criticized for "taking lightly" the public informational 
purpose of NEPA. See McGarity, The Courts,. The Agencies, and NEPA Threshold Issues, 
55 TEXAS L. REV. 801, 807 (1977). 
272 42 U.S.C. § 2039 (1976). 
273 Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519, 556 (1978); Aeschliman 
v. NRC, 547 F.2d 622, 631 (D.C. Cir. 1976). 
274 S. REP. No. 296, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 24, reprinted in [1957] U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. 
NEWS 1803, 1826. 
27. Aeschliman v. NRC, 547 F.2d 622, 631 (D.C. Cir. 1976). 
'" Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519, 556 (1978). 
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the role of the Advisory Committee reflect their different attitudes 
towards the role of the public in the licensing process. The Court of 
Appeals,277 and Judge Bazelon in particular,278 have clearly indi-
cated concern that public participation in agency proceedings be 
encouraged. Only if the licensing process is made accessible and 
understandable to the citizen can he be sure that his safety is ade-
quately protected.279 Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has not 
shown the same concern. Instead, Vermont Yankee indicates that 
the Court sees the intervenors as obstructing the administrative 
process280 and so will uphold agency procedures limiting their partic-
ipation. 
N. CONCLUSION 
Vermont Yankee presented several issues relating to the licensure 
of nuclear power plants. By upholding the Vermont Yankee plant 
license despite the Commission's refusal to consider waste disposal 
and fuel reprocessing in the licensing hearing, the Supreme Court 
indicated that it will not require an agency to comply strictly with 
NEPA. This result represents a large step backwards from the posi-
tion taken by the lower courts regarding NEPA compliance. More-
over, in deciding that the Commission cannot be required to provide 
procedures beyond the APA notice and comment minimum for an 
informal rule making, the Court failed to confront the problems that 
hybrid rule making creates for effective judicial review. This deci-
sion may encourage agencies to substitute rule making for adjudica-
tory proceedings, thereby making judicial review of environmentally 
related administrative decisions more difficult. 
The resolution of both issues involving the Midland plant de-
creased the role of the public in the licensing proceedings. The Court 
deferred to the Commission's discretion in upholding the threshold 
test, enabling the agency to limit the alternatives it must consider. 
As a consequence, public interest groups may have greater difficulty 
challenging agency decisions. In addition, the Court interpreted the 
Advisory Committee's legislative history as giving its role of inform-
277 NRDC v. NRC, 547 F.2d 633, 655 (D.C. Cir. 1976). 
278 [d. See, e.g., Citizens for Safe Power, Inc. v. NRC, 524 F.2d 1291, 1303 (D.C. Cir. 1975) 
(Bazelon, J., concurring); American Public Power Ass'n. v. FPC, 522 F.2d 142, 147 (D.C. Cir. 
1975) (Bazelon, J., concurring)." 
270 Aeschliman v. NRC, 547 F:2d 622, 631 (D.C. Cir. 1976). 
280 See, e.g., Vermont Yankee Nudear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519, 553-54 (1978). 
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ing the public a secondary position to its duty to advise the Com-
mission. By allowing the agency to issue reports not readily under-
stood by the public, the decision allows the Commission to put one 
more barrier in the way of effective public scrutiny of the agency's 
actions. 
Vermont Yankee represents a reversal in the trend of environmen-
tal law. Until Vermont Yankee, cases in this area have generally 
followed the lower court rulings of the early 1970's strictly enforcing 
the mandate that federal agencies comply with NEPA procedures 
"to the fullest extent possible."281 In contrast, the Supreme Court 
has now deferred to agency procedural discretion, sacrificed envi-
ronmental considerations and instructed the lower courts not to 
disturb an agency's decisions unless there are "substantial proce-
dural or substantive reasons."282 By minimizing NEPA's role in re-
straining agencies, and by holding sacrosanct agency discretion, the 
Court has dealt environmental law a severe blow. 283 
281 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1976). 
'82 Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519, 558 (1978). 
283 Throughout its opinion, the Supreme Court freely criticized the intervenors and the 
Court of Appeals for delaying the licensing process. E.g., id. at 554, 558. These comments 
unnecessarily confuse the issues and indicate that the Court overcompensated in its decision. 
The Court railed at the intervenors' "unjustified obstructionism." Id. at 553. This criticism 
is aimed at the wrong target. A survey of 23 nuclear plants scheduled for operation in 1973 
showed that legal challenges affected only four plants for a total of nine plant/months. In 
contrast, equipment failures affected six plants, causing delays of 15 plant/months, late 
delivery delayed nine plants for 68 plant/months, and poor labor productivity delayed 16 
plants for 84 plant/months. Davis, Citizen's Guide to Intervention in Nuclear Power Plant 
Siting: A Blueprint for Alice in Nuclear Wonderland, 6 ENVT'L L. 621, 652-53 n.l71 (1976), 
quoting Hearings on Nuclear Plant Siting and Licensing Before the Joint Comm. on Atomic 
Energy, 93rd Cong., 2nd. Sess. v. n, 1147 (1974). 
The Court castigated the Court of Appeals for interfering with the congressional policy to 
"try nuclear energy." Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519, 558 
(1978). Apparently the Court reads congressional policy selectively, Congress may have de-
cided to try nuclear energy, but in NEPA it also committed itself to a policy of environmental 
protection. The Court's failure to see the conflict between the two acts is at least as disturbing 
as the legal direction taken by the opinion. 
